who from sheer stupidity or spinelessness drifts with the streams ??

this apropos
             the wage class white yankees
given the push me- pull me ...tar baby ..sand  trap
political antinomies of our white  nation's post X-man kultur

how can struggle and class clash sharpen the unit perceptrons sufficiently to escape
 these socially internalized meme-processing    snares ??

creating a minds immediate 3D  neighborhood social reality
as ontically  class cloven  mayhaps ?? 

hide the real value added

where the real value is added on a multi sourced product is hard to determine
particularly  if  much of the transacting is non arms length and internal  to one outfit

findings of fact ???

"The fact that the overall import content of U.S. consumer goods has remained relatively constant while the Chinese share has doubled indicates that Chinese gains have come, in large part, at the expense of other exporting nations"

" it does not seem that so far Chinese exporters are fully passing through their domestic inflation. In May 2011, prices of Chinese imports only increased 2.8% from May 2010. "

in this light
if we had a serious rmb reval ???
maybe so what no import tsunami

" of the 11.5% of U.S. consumer spending that goes for goods and services produced abroad, 7.3% reflects the cost of imports. The remaining 4.2% goes for U.S. transportation, wholesale, and retail activities. Thus, 36% of the price U.S. consumers pay for imported goods actually goes to U.S. companies and workers."

"This U.S. fraction is much higher for imports from China." !!!!!!

" Whereas goods labeled “Made in China” make up 2.7% of U.S. consumer spending, only 1.2% actually reflects the cost of the imported goods. Thus, on average, of every dollar spent on an item labeled “Made in China,” 55 cents go for services produced in the United States. In other words, the U.S. content of “Made in China” is about 55%."

      waving it off :???

" The fact that the U.S. content of Chinese goods is much higher than for imports as a whole is mainly due to higher retail and wholesale margins on consumer electronics and clothing than on most other goods and services"

36% vs 55% hmmmmm


"When total import content is considered, 13.9% of U.S. consumer spending can be traced to the cost of imported goods and services. This is substantially higher than the 7.3%,

wave off II:

". Imported oil, which makes up a large part of the production costs of the “gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods” and “transportation” categories, is the main contributor to this 6.6 percentage point difference."
but how about chinese content ???

"The total share of PCE that goes for goods and services imported from China is 1.9%. This is 0.7 percentage point more than the share of Chinese-produced final goods and services in PCE. "

****PCE =  personal; consumption expenditures
"The fraction of import content attributable to Chinese imports has doubled over the past decade"


"a large share of Chinese production costs consists of imports from other countries.
 . In 2009, it cost about $179 in China to produce an iPhone, which sold in the United States for about $500.
 Thus, $179 of the U.S. retail cost consisted of Chinese imported content.

However, only $6.50 was actually due to assembly costs in China.

 The other $172.50 reflected costs of parts produced in other countries,
 including $10.75 for parts made in the United States."

no parts made in china ???

more detail ...
"chinese Import content of U.S. personal consumption expenditures by category"

Chinese goods account for 2.7% of U.S. PCE, about one-quarter of the 11.5% foreign share. .

Local content of “Made in China”

Obviously, if a pair of sneakers made in China costs $70 in the United States, not all of that retail price goes to the Chinese manufacturer. In fact, the bulk of the retail price pays for transportation of the sneakers in the United States, rent for the store where they are sold, profits for shareholders of the U.S. retailer, and the cost of marketing the sneakers. These costs include the salaries, wages, and benefits paid to the U.S. workers and managers who staff these operations.

Table 1 shows that, of the 11.5% of U.S. consumer spending that goes for goods and services produced abroad, 7.3% reflects the cost of imports. The remaining 4.2% goes for U.S. transportation, wholesale, and retail activities. Thus, 36% of the price U.S. consumers pay for imported goods actually goes to U.S. companies and workers.

This U.S. fraction is much higher for imports from China. Whereas goods labeled “Made in China” make up 2.7% of U.S. consumer spending, only 1.2% actually reflects the cost of the imported goods. Thus, on average, of every dollar spent on an item labeled “Made in China,” 55 cents go for services produced in the United States. In other words, the U.S. content of “Made in China” is about 55%. The fact that the U.S. content of Chinese goods is much higher than for imports as a whole is mainly due to higher retail and wholesale margins on consumer electronics and clothing than on most other goods and services.

Total import content of U.S. PCE

Not all goods and services imported into the United States are directly sold to households. Many are used in the production of goods and services in the United States. Hence, part of the 88.5% of spending on goods and services labeled “Made in the USA” pays for imported intermediate goods and services. To properly account for the share of imports in U.S. consumer spending, it’s necessary to take into account the contribution of these imported intermediate inputs. We use input-output tables to compute the contribution of imports to U.S. production of final goods and services. Combining the imported share of U.S.-produced goods and services with imported goods and services directly sold to consumers yields the total import content of PCE.

Table 1 also shows total import content as a fraction of total PCE and its subcategories. When total import content is considered, 13.9% of U.S. consumer spending can be traced to the cost of imported goods and services. This is substantially higher than the 7.3%, which includes only final imported goods and services and leaves out imported intermediates. Imported oil, which makes up a large part of the production costs of the “gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods” and “transportation” categories, is the main contributor to this 6.6 percentage point difference.

Figure 1
Import content of U.S. PCE, 2000–2010

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census Bureau, and authors’ calculations.

The total share of PCE that goes for goods and services imported from China is 1.9%. This is 0.7 percentage point more than the share of Chinese-produced final goods and services in PCE. This difference is mainly due to the use of intermediate goods imported from China in the U.S. production of services.

Figure 1 plots the total and Chinese import content of U.S. PCE over the past decade. The import content of PCE has been relatively constant at between 11.7% and 14.2%. Import content peaked in 2008 at 14.2%, which was probably due to the spike in oil prices at the time. The share of imports in PCE is slightly lower than in GDP as a whole because the import content of investment goods turns out to be twice as high as that of consumer goods and services.

The fraction of import content attributable to Chinese imports has doubled over the past decade. In 2000, Chinese goods accounted for 0.9% of the content of PCE. In 2010, Chinese goods accounted for 1.9%. The fact that the overall import content of U.S. consumer goods has remained relatively constant while the Chinese share has doubled indicates that Chinese gains have come, in large part, at the expense of other exporting nations.

Broader implications

The import content of U.S. PCE attributable to imports from China is useful in understanding where revenue generated by sales to U.S. households flows. It is also important because it affects to what extent price increases for Chinese goods are likely to pass through to U.S. consumer prices.

China’s 2011 inflation rate is close to 5%. If Chinese exporters were to pass through all their domestic inflation to the prices of goods they sell in the United States, the PCE price index (PCEPI) would only increase by 1.9% of this 5%, reflecting the Chinese share of U.S. consumer goods and services. That would equal a 0.1 percentage point increase in the PCEPI. The inflationary effects would be highest in the industries in which the share of Chinese imports is highest—clothing and shoes, and electronics. In fact, recent data show accelerating price increases for these goods compared with other goods.

However, it does not seem that so far Chinese exporters are fully passing through their domestic inflation. In May 2011, prices of Chinese imports only increased 2.8% from May 2010. This is partly because a large share of Chinese production costs consists of imports from other countries. Xing and Detert (2010) demonstrate this by examining the production costs of an iPhone. In 2009, it cost about $179 in China to produce an iPhone, which sold in the United States for about $500. Thus, $179 of the U.S. retail cost consisted of Chinese imported content. However, only $6.50 was actually due to assembly costs in China. The other $172.50 reflected costs of parts produced in other countries, including $10.75 for parts made in the United States.

.

ConclusionFigure 2 shows the share of U.S. PCE based on where goods were produced, taking into account intermediate goods production, and the domestic and foreign content of imports. Of the 2.7% of U.S. consumer purchases going to goods labeled “Made in China,” only 1.2% actually represents China-produced content. If we take into account imported intermediate goods, about 13.9% of U.S. consumer spending is attributable to imports, including 1.9% imported from China.

Since the share of PCE attributable to imports from China is less than 2% and some of this can be traced to production in other countries, it is unlikely that recent increases in labor costs and inflation in China will generate broad-based inflationary pressures in the United States.

mystical duet

'there is an uncanny negative correlation across individual manufacturing industries between employment changes in China and the US. Where China has expanded the most, the US has lost the greatest number of jobs. In the few industries that contracted in China, the US has gained employment."
DR

dani sums up

"Since 1990, manufacturing’s share of employment has fallen by nearly five percentage points. This would not necessarily have been a bad thing if labor productivity (and earnings) were not substantially higher in manufacturing than in the rest of the economy – 75% higher, in fact.

The service industries that have absorbed the labor released from manufacturing are a mixed bag

. At the high end, finance, insurance, and business services, taken together, have productivity levels that are similar to manufacturing.

These industries have created some new jobs, but not many – and that was before the financial crisis erupted in 2008.

The bulk of new employment has come in “personal and social services,” which is where the economy’s least productive jobs are found.

 This migration of jobs down the productivity ladder has shaved 0.3 percentage points off US productivity growth every year since 1990 – roughly one-sixth of the actual gain over this period.

The growing proportion of low-productivity labor has also contributed to rising inequality in American society.

The loss of US manufacturing jobs accelerated after 2000, with global competition the ... culprit."

delong nut unhusked unshelled undressed

"In order to properly respond to the situation today
policy makers  need to forget everything they thought they knew about the world in the summer of 2009
 and look at the situation with fresh eyes"

and just who does brad suggest might accomplish this ??

Laura Tyson

Larry Summers

Alan Blinder

Christy Romer

err or  "someone like"  them

and just what might they do brad ???

i mean now he wants  the sunk cost fetishists gentle ben and tiny tim
                                                    OUT !!!!

goes he still think his earlier remedies could  power a swift job recovery ??

reviewing :


"The Fed via quantitative easing could take as much risk as it wanted to onto its balance sheet and replace the risky assets it bought with safe assets that the private sector wanted to hold--the Fed could push its balance sheet up from $2 trillion to $3, $4, $5, or even $6 trillion if needed. The Treasury could use its HAMP money to grease the refinancing of troubled mortgages. If HAMP wasn't enough the Treasury owned Fannie and Freddie: they could borrow at nearly the Treasury rate and refinance every house in the nation if necessary in order to get mortgage risk off of banks' books where it constrained lending and off of households' obligations where it constrained spending. The Treasury could use additional TARP money as the grease via the PPIP to take tail risk onto its books and so transform risky into safe assets. The Fed could take the TALF program and use it as a wrapper to make the long-run infrastructure projects we needed to undertake sources of the safe assets the private sector wanted to hold.
Even with a Congress gridlocked and neutralized, the Fed and the executive had enough power through their ownership of Fannie and Freddie, through the Federal Reserve act, and through the TARP to do everything necessary to guarantee a strong recovery"

such is the elite prog-neo lib response then and prolly still now

do they believe anymore ??
seems pk doesn't
but brad ????

 talk about sunk cost based fetishism

ya these all should be done if for nothing at least  for their  internal equity
but job market  recovery requires
not an end run around
but  a march  straight thru the congress

ie a stimpak II
 an eye popping freshet of funds
out flowing thru the transfer system
and a vast payroll tax holiday and a  health premium rebate
funded by uncle
 administered by and fed thru  the corporate plans
and an SSI refund of the index theft
etc etc etc

brad:
the  post 1980 elite liberal fantasy
of running a perpetual national prosperity and  progress machine
  by means of the unelected  fed board alone  is ...dead
ie new keynesian pipsqueaking won't cut the whole block of fuckin ice
now around the national  production system ......no not by a long shot

a giant block of ice  you NK's couldn't anticipate because you couldn't  produce em
even with your air conditioning  models set to  desert mode

preserving the delong treasure pieces part zero

Back in the summer of 2009, Barack Obama had five economic policy principals on the Treasury Bench:

• Tim Geithner, who thought that the administration and the Fed had done enough to stabilize the economy, that we were on track for a rapid recovery, and that the principal economic policy problems were going to be avoiding an unwanted uptick in inflation and dealing with the long-run budget.
• Ben Bernanke, who thought that the administration and the Fed had done enough to stabilize the economy, that we were on track for a rapid recovery, and that the principal economic policy problems were going to be avoiding an unwanted uptick in inflation and dealing with the long-run budget.
• Peter Orszag, who thought that the economy probably needed some (relatively small) additional fiscal, banking, and monetary stimulus to boost demand, but that the path to getting to that stimulus was to make it part of a package with policies to deal with the long-run budget.
• Larry Summers, who thought that the economy probably would need some additional fiscal, monetary, and banking-side stimulus--if only as insurance--and that dealing with the long-run budget could wait until the recovery was well-established (although in an ideal world Washington would be able to do more than one thing at a time and so it would not have to wait).
• Christy Romer, who thought that the economy probably needed (much) more additional fiscal, monetary, and banking-side stimulus--especially as insurance should things break badly--and that dealing with the long-run budget crisis probably should wait until the recovery was well-established: that the key point was "no 1937s!"

Opposite the Treasury Bench was the Right Opposition, with its guiding principle: never mind everything we have said in the past, whatever Obama proposes we reject.
And over in the corner was the Left Opposition, represented by:

• Paul Krugman, who thought not quite "we are all going to die!" but rather that without five-alarm stimulus the risks were very high of a jobless recovery stemming from a combination of labor-market changes that had eliminated the temporary layoff and so the economy's ability to rapidly bounce-back on the labor side and of the fact that a financial-crisis solvency and safety squeeze was different from a monetary liquidity squeeze along the lines argued by Koo, Reinhart, Rogoff, and before them Bagehot, Minsky, and Kindleberger. And that Christy Romer was a wild-eyed optimist.

At the time I was, IIRC, somewhere between Christy and Larry--thinking that the risks of a jobless recovery were there and certainly demanded action as insurance, but that nobody wanted to see 1937 again, and that even without the cooperation of Congress the administration and the Federal Reserve had powerful tools and could and would stabilize aggregate demand.
The key, after all, is to get people to spend. Three things could keep people from spending:

1. A shortage of liquidity--and the Fed had and would continue to keep there from being any shortage of liquidity.
2. A shortage of savings vehicles--but that did not seem to be the case as the bonds of even good companies were not selling for the high prices you would have then expected to see.
3. A shortage of safety or an excess of risk in their portfolios--both on the debit and the credit side.

The first of these had been solved by the Fed. The second of these was not an issue. And the Fed and the Treasury had mighty tools to solve the third. The Fed via quantitative easing could take as much risk as it wanted to onto its balance sheet and replace the risky assets it bought with safe assets that the private sector wanted to hold--the Fed could push its balance sheet up from $2 trillion to $3, $4, $5, or even $6 trillion if needed. The Treasury could use its HAMP money to grease the refinancing of troubled mortgages. If HAMP wasn't enough the Treasury owned Fannie and Freddie: they could borrow at nearly the Treasury rate and refinance every house in the nation if necessary in order to get mortgage risk off of banks' books where it constrained lending and off of households' obligations where it constrained spending. The Treasury could use additional TARP money as the grease via the PPIP to take tail risk onto its books and so transform risky into safe assets. The Fed could take the TALF program and use it as a wrapper to make the long-run infrastructure projects we needed to undertake sources of the safe assets the private sector wanted to hold.
Even with a Congress gridlocked and neutralized, the Fed and the executive had enough power through their ownership of Fannie and Freddie, through the Federal Reserve act, and through the TARP to do everything necessary to guarantee a strong recovery.
But the problem I did not see in the summer of 2009 was that the stimulus skeptics were the operational managers of the government, while the stimulus advocates were staff without line responsibilities.
Hence nothing happened.
And Peter, Larry, and Christy left.
And their successors--Jack, Gene, and Austen--are very smart men and dedicated civil servants, but they lack the strong substance-matter knowledge and aggressive policy views of their predecessors.
So the only strong policy views in the administration's internal debate mix right now are those of people who were wrong in the summer of 2009.
And when I talk to their staffs, the message I hear is not "we were wrong about how the world works, and are rethinking the issues from the ground up to figure out what to do" but instead "we were unlucky: our policies were good". Never mind that Richard Koo or Carmen Reinhart or Ken Rogoff or indeed all of us who have ever taught the Great Depression in Europe foresaw the rerun of 1931s Credit-Anstalt crisis that is now playing at the European cinema. If I were as unkind as Jon Walker, I would say that I am reminded of the old Scooby-Doo TV series, in which at the end the villain always says: "My plan was perfect, perfect! I would have gotten away with it if not for those meddling PIIGS!"
Three years ago I would have said--I did say--that Ben Bernanke was among the best available candidates for Fed chair and that Tim Geithner was among the best available candidates for Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.
Today I think they both suffer from the sunk-costs problem.
In order to properly respond to the situation today they need to forget everything they thought they knew about the world in the summer of 2009 and look at the situation with fresh eyes. I don't think they have done that. i don't think they can do that. And yet theirs seem to be the only strong policy voices from people with deep substance-matter expertise that Obama hears
If you were to ask me what thing--aside from the complete and immediate collapse of the Republican Party and the resignation of all of its legislators from both houses of the Congress: if the previous fifteen years had not taught me that Republican politicians have nothing useful to contribute to national governance the last three years would certainly have done so--would most give me confidence that America would surmount this current economic crisis, it would be personnel changes to put qualified people who saw the world as it was in the summer of 2009 into the key economic jobs:

• Laura Tyson or someone like her to Treasury Secretary (recess-appointed, acting, whatever).
• Larry Summers or someone like him to Fed Chair (recess-appointed, acting, whatever).
• Alan Blinder or someone like him to CEA Chair (recess-appointed, acting, whatever)
• Christy Romer or someone like her to Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.