## Saturday, March 31, 2012

### It's all about bad ideas rich cranks believe ...and keep in currency

Pk again

Crank billionaires keeprefloating the Bad memes

But pk what if a saturation of the communication channels
With bad memes make for higher long run capitalist value paths

Globe trotter corporate capitalism

### Fatal words "it's a credibility thing "

Pk
Tries to shave gentle Ben as a group think stinker
Assimilated by the fedborg

Nonsense he wanted to join the boys in the top floor office
And they don't play with telekinetic flap doodle

The expectations cred game is of course where you end up
If your mission is constrained by this boundary

You must work thru the existing institutional system
The credit markets and amerika's board rooms

Uncle and his fed can't play BUSH baby god to the marketplace

Making reality not just working in it and thru it

### The windfall profits on crude

Domestic well heads today ought to produce revenue gushers for uncle

The rate of exploration is governed by market prices and marginal costs

The existing wells prospered at far lower crude prices
Tax away the rents and pay it out in reduced payroll taxes and raised retirement payments

The pump level taxes should be used similarly of course

Road building etc needs funding by direct C/B Calculations

This is all trivial
But I heeded to get it off my chest

We are at a big turn in energy pricing but the specs with credit backing
can Keep this rip off going a few more years

The smart ass notion we face political constraints on raw supply
Are a rich joke
Rich enough to fund the Iran containment crisis all by itself

## Friday, March 30, 2012

### The beauty of shock causation

The now top rated template for foolery

The starkwatson paper

Sees
We had a recession much like the prior two recessions even if different from the recessions from 46 to 87

Just bigger shocks
End of story

The internal crisis the implosion in fact of the credit system
Is a shock like a drought or earthquake or hurricane or war or méteor
Or or space invasion....

Just a really big set of closely bunched shocks

Moral
Hope for
Better luck next time

## Thursday, March 29, 2012

### Shock talk has it's limitations

A recent shock model applied to the now completed GDP contraction and recovery
Underlines the ridiculousness of these models

So why was this cycle so deep and slow in recovery ?

Enter ivy league number crunchers
Marcus " slick" Watson
Jimmy Starkweather

Disentangling the channels of the 2007-2009 recession
By Harvard Professor James Stock and Princeton Professor Mark Watson

Paraphrase by a Jack ass

"Stock and Watson characterized the comovements over 1959:Q1-2007:Q3 of 198 different U.S. macroeconomic variables...

Their first question was whether the observed U.S. macroeconomic data continued to track those factors in the same way during the most recent recession and recovery as they had historically. Stock and Watson's answer was, for the most part, yes. ...

But if the Great Recession can be interpreted as normal responses to abnormally large shocks, what about the anemic recovery? Stock and Watson attribute this to a slowdown in trend growth rates... Again quoting from Stock and Watson's paper:

The explanation for this declining trend growth rate which we find the most compelling rests on changes in underlying demographic factors, primarily the plateau over the past decade in the female labor force participation rate (after rising sharply during the 1970s through

1990s) and the aging of the U.S. workforce. Because the net change in mean productivity growth over this period is small, this slower trend growth in employment corresponds directly to slowdown in trend GDP growth. These demographic changes imply continued low or even declining trend growth rates in employment, which in turn imply that future recessions will be deeper, and will have slower recoveries, than historically has been the case. In other words, jobless recoveries will be the norm."

The slow recovery is structural not macro policy optional

In fact their model implied
an even slower recovery then we have !!!

See post the volcker figure four credit lock
We had our last fast recovery
Since then the rising gal Participation rate of the post Truman era
has first slowed and is now flat
and with aging of the native born pop
Labor force %

Each of the last three recoveries has reflected this climate change in job life

We got ourselves
A regular Says law of job market growth here

Apart from productivity gains thru implemented innovations in the social production system
The economy is the size job class souls choose it to be
looking at the job or non job decision
We now choose it to grow slower
we don't what to job attend more
we want to leisure up more

Ominous side bar

Not recovery in the future will be slow AND contractions greater
Ie deeper recessions ???

How this demographic shift " deepens "
future recessions however
Escapaes me

## Tuesday, March 27, 2012

### Assume a bank

What can a bank do
With a fixed source of credit ie money
Increase velocity
Has that got a maximum limit of extension ?
Is that limit the fractional reserve multiplier ?

------

What if every loan got it's repayment term doubled?

### What do your monetary rule numbers look like ?

Here's the algebra

Weigh slack and excessive unemployment
against
inflation ...rather
Weigh it against
the hydra that is called inflation

### reply to " doc dick "

paine said in reply to DrDick...
perfect markets drive product prices
toward zero profit levels
at social welfare optimal speed
each product has a potentially different
" market design" for price path perfection

see late akerlof on this
and then see late akerloff
reject the whole perfect market paradigm
-------------------
despite the attentuated toon version
of a complex
and explicitly
enlightenment thinker
we now still call " adam smith"
capitalism can not transcend
its inherent agency problems
thru the miracle healings
of perfect market worship
paine said in reply to paine...
and if you want "better markets"
then its not enough to understand real markets
you have to go out and redesign them
one by one
layer upon layer nest within nest
that is
the as yet
un publicly acknowledged
secular mission
of the still ungathered
knights of GOSPLAN II

## Monday, March 26, 2012

### why deficit macro in the first place

we have a trade gap to close before we can discuss
a zero deficit
full employment
consolidated
public sector budget

too much chitter implicitly  pre supposes we can't close this gap
and simply compounds the fuddlement over finite  fiscal "space "

------------------------

keynes expected a chronic excess of household savings
a "problem" easily solved if it ever exists
by tax policy

the leninist notion of a national surplus of capital
is a different matter all  to gether of course
that is the quintessence of corporate neo-imperialism

### two ways to bust the zero bind on negative real rates of interest

that is the usual zero binder graphicated

but ....
we all know you can raise the expected rate of inflation
to lower the reat rate of the safe rate
but how about raising the acceptable rate of default risk ?

ya ya ya
not compatible with a  profit max guided credit supply system

but ...
enter  a robust SBA  and high tech banking pair

------------------------

nb

obviously the risk premium is attached to non treausy issues
and to "manage " risky rates requires intervention in risky issue markets
however a public credit based set of banks could simply carry this portfolio of high risk loans at the optimal real rate (negative in extremo even ..if necessary)

the outcome of these new risky loans would be to reduce systemic risk by  generating the additional spending that powers a fast recovery and obviously a falling default rate on existing securitized loans

### pugsley post mortems his joint roast

"We were challenged on the proper estimate of the multiplier μ and challenged (quite rightly) on our guesses of the hysteresis parameter η, the share of a current downturn that is the shadow cast on future potential output. We were challenged by those saying that America's debt capacity should not be used now but should be kept ready and dry to be used in some future crisis in which using it could do much more good than it would now. We were challenged by those who think that the U.S. is on the edge of losing not just its exorbitant privilege that allows it to borrow enormous amounts at negative real interest rates but is on the point of seeing a complete revolution in interest rates that will push the rates at which the Treasury can borrow up into high single or double digits.
But on our basic arithmetic we were not challenged: it is that fiscal policy in a depressed economy is self-financing as long as:
where r is the real Treasury borrowing rate--take the nominal Treasury borrowing rates and subtract 2%--g is the growth rate, which is 2.5%; τ is the fraction of GDP that shows up as increased tax revenues and reduced social-insurance transfers, which is 1/3; μ is the (debatable) standard Keynesian multiplier when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound; and η is the (largely unknown) hysteresis shadow a long, deep depression casts on future potential output.
As we, at least see it, it is possible to be highly confident that the depressed-economy standard Keynesian multiplier when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound μ is greater than 1.0, and substantially confident that the hysteresis shadow η cast by a long, deep depression is greater than 0.05.
The arithmetic means that over the past four years fiscal policy has been self-financing, and would be self-financing unless the real Treasury borrowing rate is rapidly going to become greater than 5%--unless the nominal Treasury rate is rapidly going to burst through 7% heading upwards. It has simply never been at such levels seven for a short span of years during and immediately after the Volcker disinflation.
Thus even if you think that the United States is on the edge of some kind of fiscal crisis and may be about to transit from a low interest rate "confidence in government" to a high interest rate "panic" equilibrium, increases in debt-service loads relative to GDP from fiscal austerity are more likely to shock the system into the bad equilibrium than are policies of fiscal expansion which over the past four years would--exceptionally and extraordinarily--have, for once, by the arithmetic, paid for themselves.

## Friday, March 23, 2012

### The Larry Ziffle and Pugsley comedy hour

This gong show look alike team product
deserves a close marginal commentary

I shall so essay  in time

but first the sacred text :
"We are here to say that, as a matter of arithmetic, in a depressed economy like the present, if a long deep recession casts even a small shadow on future potential output, with interest rates in the range at which the U.S. has been able to borrow, there is a substantial likelihood that expansionary fiscal policy right now would be self-financing, and an overwhelming likelihood that it would pass a benefit-cost test.
Since the start of 2007, CBO has repeatedly and substantially marked down its estimates of potential output a decade hence. For each percent that output falls below potential for a year, the CBO mark down its estimate of the long run potential of the economy by 0.2%.
The CBO is not an outlier among forecasters.
If higher output this year raises potential output in the future by a fraction η because it reduces the shadow cast by the downturn through discouraged workers, lost skills, broken organizations, and missing investment on future productivity, then boosting government purchases now, in an environment with a policy-relevant net-of-monetary-policy-offset Keynesian multiplier μ, boosts future real GDP by the multiplier times some hysteresis coefficient η. That means that in an environment with a tax rate τ, the flow of future total tax collections are boosted by τημ.
The extra debt incurred by a temporary government purchases expansion ΔG in an environment with a policy-relevant net-of-monetary-policy-offset Keynesian multiplier μ and a tax rate τ is (1 - μτ). If the government maintains a stable debt-to-GDP ratio then the cost of amortizing this extra debt is (r - g)(1 - μτ), where r is the real interest rate at which the Treasury borrows, and g is the long-term growth rate of the economy.
If:
r < g + τημ/(1 - μτ)
then we simply cannot do a benefit-cost calculation for expansionary fiscal policy. It is self-financing. There are no costs. No future tax increases are needed to amortize the extra debt, because economic growth does it on its own.
It is, rather, austerity that requires future tax increases.
For a multiplier μ = 1.0, a hysteresis shadow-cast-by-the-recession coefficient η = 0.1, a growth rate g = 2.5%/year, and a tax share τ = 1/3, this critical value of r becomes:
r < 7.5%
The long-run Treasury borrowing rate needs to be above 7.5%/year in real terms--above 9.5%/year in nominal terms--for fiscal expansion to be a bad deal.
For a multiplier μ = 0.5, a hysteresis shadow-cast-by-the-recession coefficient η = 0.05, a growth rate g = 2.5%/year, and a tax share τ = 1/3, (6) becomes:
r < 3.75%
The long-run Treasury borrowing rate needs to be above 3.75%/year in real terms--above 5.75%/year in nominal terms--for fiscal expansion to be a bad deal.
Note that this applies only to a depressed economy, and only as long as the monetary authority cannot or will not--but in any case does not--carry out the government's full stabilization policy mission all by itself.
If the self-financing condition fails, there is a benefit-cost calculation to do. Write down the net effect of expansionary fiscal policy on the present value of future output:
ΔV = [μ(1 + η(1 + ξτ)/(r-g) - ξ(1 - μτ)]ΔG
with ξ being the national income lost from raising an extra dollar of revenue from future taxes.
The last term is the burden placed on the economy from the taxes needed to amortize the additional debt.
The second term is the extra future production because lessening the current downturn lessens the destructive shadow cast on the economy in the long run. This middle term plausibly doubles or triples the benefits of expansionary policy above those of higher output from the multiplier μ in the present period alone. (9) tells us that, for a multiplier μ = 0.5, an η = 0.05, τ = 1/3, g = .025, and an r = 6%, expansionary fiscal policy passes its benefit-cost test as long as raising \$1.00 in extra tax revenue through distortionary taxes reduces national income by less than \$10.00.
In this depressed-economy framework at least, you have to get far out toward the edge of the parameter space in order for expansionary fiscal policy to flunk its cost-benefit test.
Does this prove too much?
No.
In normal times the logic of Taylor (2000) that stabilization policy should be left to the monetary authority still holds. It is only in extraordinary times, like now, that this argument has force.
In normal times expansionary fiscal policy as a stabilization policy will flunk its benefit-cost test. In normal times the multiplier μ will be close to zero. Perhaps the monetary authority will have a view about how the economy should evolve in a way that is consistent with long-run price stability, will not want its elbow joggled by others, and will thus take anticipatory steps to offset any effect of expansionary fiscal policy on output. Perhaps the monetary authority will watch fiscal expansion raise output, disapprove of the resultant increase in inflation, and then offset it by creating an equal and opposite output gap later. Either way the policy-relevant multiplier μ is zero. Either way, expansionary fiscal policy as stabilization policy has only costs and no stabilization-policy benefits.
In a depressed economy, however, there is less increase in inflationary expectations following from higher output, and less reason for the monetary authority to fully offset the effects of expansionary fiscal policy.
Hence our conclusions.
How could this argument go wrong?
The fear is that expansionary fiscal policy will lead to a collapse in confidence in the government, and a spiking of interest and inflation rates to previously-unseen values.
But since austerity appears, for what we see as reasonable parameter values, at least as likely likely to erode the government's fiscal room to maneuver than temporary expansion, this seems backward. if the logic of this argument is correct, then it is a failure to engage in expansionary fiscal policy right now--a failure to speed recovery and so reduce the long-term shadow cast on future productivity by the downturn--that is the real threat to long-run fiscal stability.
Sovereign debt crises can be triggered by rises in spending due to expansion. They can also be triggered by falls in growth and taxes due to austerity."

### Who benefitted from Debt that went straight thru as capitalized ground rent

And to think.

A whole lot of the lot values went gonzo
In the recent debacle

The usual assumption seems to be the mortgage " bought " something
Not all of it did
Just as appreciation of lot values above purchase price plus product inflation
hardly represents in and of itself... Anything deserving of protection

If uncle's developed and zoned land trust
bought all the house lots in America
And then charged ground rent
would the mortgage free or low mortgage crowd go along with it ?

## Wednesday, March 21, 2012

### merit class misallocation of skills or over supply ??

"the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that in 2010
only 20% of jobs required a bachelor's degree"

whereas about 30% of the job class claims to have a BA

".. 26% of jobs did not even require a high school diploma"

"...43% required only a high school diploma or equivalent"

" this isn't going to change much by 2020 "

BLS predicts over supply ??

will even more absurd pre requisite  gauntleting result  ??

cashiers/tellers require two year college degree ??

### ned nails the strang-state of the corporatists

sees two enemies of a progressive dy-nam-a-nam-a-nam-i-call-eee robust

international   production platform

socialists ...ya ya ya ...and CORPORATISTS

two  spectres  haunt the planet
and both dig

a  big fat state

---------------------------
mussolini-nomics
" The term “capitalism” used to mean an economic system in which capital was privately owned and traded; owners of capital got to judge how best to use it, and could draw on the foresight and creative ideas of entrepreneurs and innovative thinkers. This system of individual freedom and individual responsibility gave little scope for government to influence economic decision-making: success meant profits; failure meant losses. Corporations could exist only as long as free individuals willingly purchased their goods – and would go out of business quickly otherwise."

"Capitalism became a world-beater in the 1800’s, when it developed capabilities for endemic innovation. Societies that adopted the capitalist system gained unrivaled prosperity, enjoyed widespread job satisfaction, obtained productivity growth that was the marvel of the world and ended mass privation."

"Now the capitalist system has been corrupted. The managerial state has assumed responsibility for looking after everything from the incomes of the middle class to the profitability of large corporations to industrial advancement. This system, however, is not capitalism, but rather an economic order that harks back to Bismarck in the late nineteenth century and Mussolini in the twentieth: corporatism."

In various ways, corporatism chokes off the dynamism that makes for engaging work, faster economic growth, and greater opportunity and inclusiveness. It maintains lethargic, wasteful, unproductive, and well-connected firms at the expense of dynamic newcomers and outsiders, and favors declared goals such as industrialization, economic development, and national greatness over individuals’ economic freedom and responsibility. Today, airlines, auto manufacturers, agricultural companies, media, investment banks, hedge funds, and much more has at some point been deemed too important to weather the free market on its own, receiving a helping hand from government in the name of the “public good.”
The costs of corporatism are visible all around us: dysfunctional corporations that survive despite their gross inability to serve their customers; sclerotic economies with slow output growth, a dearth of engaging work, scant opportunities for young people; governments bankrupted by their efforts to palliate these problems; and increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of those connected enough to be on the right side of the corporatist deal.
This shift of power from owners and innovators to state officials is the antithesis of capitalism. Yet this system’s apologists and beneficiaries have the temerity to blame all these failures on “reckless capitalism” and “lack of regulation,” which they argue necessitates more oversight and regulation, which in reality means more corporatism and state favoritism.
It seems unlikely that so disastrous a system is sustainable. The corporatist model makes no sense to younger generations who grew up using the Internet, the world’s freest market for goods and ideas. The success and failure of firms on the Internet is the best advertisement for the free market: social networking Web sites, for example, rise and fall almost instantaneously, depending on how well they serve their customers.
Sites such as Friendster and MySpace sought extra profit by compromising the privacy of their users, and were instantly punished as users deserted them to relatively safer competitors like Facebook and Twitter. There was no need for government regulation to bring about this transition; in fact, had modern corporatist states attempted to do so, today they would be propping up MySpace with taxpayer dollars and campaigning on a promise to “reform” its privacy features.
The Internet, as a largely free marketplace for ideas, has not been kind to corporatism. People who grew up with its decentralization and free competition of ideas must find alien the idea of state support for large firms and industries. Many in the traditional media repeat the old line “What's good for Firm X is good for America,” but it is not likely to be seen trending on Twitter.
The legitimacy of corporatism is eroding along with the fiscal health of governments that have relied on it. If politicians cannot repeal corporatism, it will bury itself in debt and default, and a capitalist system could re-emerge from the discredited corporatist rubble. Then “capitalism” would again carry its true meaning, rather than the one attributed to it by corporatists seeking to hide behind it and socialists wanting to vilify it."

### common marketeering in europe: liberator to strangulator

EU 15 's growth pattern

thank u Cato !!!

## Tuesday, March 13, 2012

"To start with, P + W = C + I is a combination of the two identities above, since both equal Y, they must also therefore be equal to each other. So the sum of profits and wages is equal to the sum of consumption and investment.
Renowned economist Mikhal Kalecki isolated profit from this identify by breaking down consumption into consumption by capital and consumption by workers, resulting in P + W = Cp + Cw + I. Reasoning that workers, as a class, spend all the income they make, Kalecki equated W and Cw, resulting in P = Cp + I. Meaning Profit is equal to the sum of capitalist consumption plus investment. This means that wages are essentially meaningless when it comes to profits when wages eventually return to capitalists by way of worker’s consumption.
Yet, the assumption the workers consume everything they earn as a class is based on wages being determined by an efficient labour market. Workers can, as a class, use their social power to work against the workings of the labour market.
In one of his later papers, “Class Struggle and the Distribution of the National Income”, Kalecki reasons that through non-market processes like collective bargaining, workers can negotiate wage increases that do not entirely flow back to Capital in the form of profits. Collective political action, can likewise push to enact laws and lobby for benefits that move aggregate wages above class subsistence levels, and thus enable workers to earn more than they spend, and therefore allow workers to invest, breaking the monopoly on investment enjoyed by capital.
Kalecki wrote in 1960, “According to [my] first theory, the absolute level of profits is determined by capitalist consumption and investment. According to [my] second theory, the relative share of profits in national income is determine by degree of monopoly.”
The degree of monopoly is determined by class struggle, and the relative share of profits in the national income is the result.
Roughly following Kalecki, lets expand both consumption and investment to add a class dimension, lets say P + W = Cw + Cp + Iw + Ip. Now, to isolate relative profits (R) from absolute profits, we could use R = C + Ip. In other words relative profits are equal to all consumption of capitalist goods plus investment derived from capitalist profit. The social capacity of workers to invest (Iw) reflects a part of the national income that is not being consumed, and, more importantly, not flowing through to capitalist profit.
We can now introduce a new equation to express wealth concentration (X) as X = C + Ip – Iw. This wealth concentration equation quantifies Kalecki’s concept of the “Degree of Monopoly.” This equation is macro-economically consistent, since Y = X + Iw.
If we understand that the neoliberal agenda is to maximize X, not Y, we clearly see that X can rise even if Y falls, so long as workers’ capacity to invest, meaning the amount of their income workers can sustainably divert from consumption, falls more.
Thus, the macroeconomy of class struggle boils down to this, any action that decreases X is revolutionary and any action that increases X is reactionary. Just as the concentration equation reveals the logic of neoliberal policy, this also serves to guide the objectives of all who oppose it. Understanding that the goal of neoliberalism is to make X as close to Y as possible, we know that the goal of building a fairer society requires us to increase worker’s capacity to invest as much as possible, thus reducing X as far below Y as possible."

### comment in a bottle

Black nation think may not be part of your thinkerationing  gig comrades
But here's  a term useful to me when operating from behind
the Paine nationalities desk

Helot Nation

Black America :

A Stateless sympatric “brother ” Nation
under the yoke of one mother of a Cain brother

The white nation with it’s white state

that  we are "all citizens " of this american  white state
Hardly makes the white state
the black nation’s state

Nope
it’s an occupation state

One nation’s means –among other uses–
To oppress another bunch of co resident nations big and small

a Citizen state  with internal helot nations ?

What a hog wash
What a white wash

## Monday, March 12, 2012

### building a revolutionary organization in a time and place of reform movements

the occ is a nebulosity perhaps about to split and condense
into a small number of new stars

one might be a vanguard party
but ...i doubt it

two stars seem to me more or less certain
a black block revolutionary  figment
and another certainty --that might be more like a cluster of stars --
will be a progressive coalition of concious non revolutionary reform organizations

key to the second  path
complete independence  of
if not opposition to
the Democratic party
if it remains the motley prison house
for oppressed minorities and social change progressives
that it is today

### now its stag party time for wooo -men toooo

"While the earnings of women have skyrocketed from 1964 until the late 1990s,
median earnings for women  have generally stagnated since 2001. "

### just for men

"The median wage of the American male has declined by almost \$13,000 after accounting for inflation in the four decades since 1969. This is a reduction of 28 percent! "

### rB > C very like vM = T

but vM> T might be a better rendition

neo classical hamiltonianism

might try to equate marginal rB to marginal C
mrB = mC

but only if
total rB > total C

spoof-o-nomics

## Sunday, March 11, 2012

### scale ?? sweden isn't a scale model of the U S of A .... sweden is not even california ...its more like ...a small independent ethnically homogenious nation state

so why can't pk see this
when he can write

" the general point is that when trying to learn from some country or region’s experience, you should always ask, “Is this place a reasonably good model for other places?” It’s not a matter of head counts or acreage, it’s about the story."

could the us transform itself as sweden has  since 1990 ?

check out the change in open-ness
we'd swamp the global system

is it really possible for a multi ethnic federal state like the US
to build so deeply taxing a  transfer system ?

### WITT over YOYO ? jared essays

kropotkinism and recent
bio group dynamic modeling

### e o wilsonism

“Selfishness beats altruism within groups.  Altruistic groups beat selfish groups.”

" only two per cent of insect species are eusocial, but they account for approximately eighty per cent of all insect biomass"

Sex allocation
Policing
Conflict resolution
Cooperation
Altruism
Spite
Kin discrimination
Parasite virulence
Parent–offspring conflict
Sibling conflict
Selfish genetic elements
Cannibalism
Dispersal
Alarm calls
Eusociality
Genomic imprinting

enter corina

with a model
that suggests rarity :
there are natural " barriers to the evolution of eusociality.."
".it requires a set of unusual mutations
and very particular ecological conditions."

one thinks of spinoza's closure on escaping human bondage
while remianing within the human condition

"If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered.

Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found.

How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand,
and could without great labour be found,
that it should be by almost all men neglected?

But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare "

### i answer a decent burger's honest question

yes i am prepared to watch the next generation
of americn youth reject
the 4 year
campus graze

reject the built in rip off system

in particular my own off spring
just to show you its not an abstraction
if they want to graze ...fine
borrow the money and knock yourself out

however

should we really  make
4 year college  a requirement to escape
mcjobtown ??

considr
the absurd social waste that amounts to

requiring half a nation to mass consumption 4 years of a liberal luxury product ?

a luxury product that is prolly a more intrinsically
life disrupting society disintergrating outcome
then out of wed lock birth ?

example of a good outcome ?

prolly this figment they call
the precariat revolution

now gaining youthful  adherents by the thousands
is a prime example
of 4 year college fall out

as in the semi-anarcho wing of the Occupy movement
with its emerging
"new class " "new revolution" chimera

surely this awakening
to a great degree
is an understandable  product
of too much amok time among our latest cohorts
of 4 year campus grazers

if there ever was a better example
of eating the latest crop
of college loco weed
and going off the reservation
it was prolly the RYMers of late stage SDS

think of what a god sent that was to nixon !!!!

## Saturday, March 10, 2012

### still we hear and see about growing financialization when we have in fact growing securitization

the market mediating  of credit holdings is a signifigant trend since WWII

packaging corporate and household  obligations
and then  building evolutes of these securities is what contemporary hi fi is all about

and the rise of  funds has  aggregated these holdings and centralized their mangement

effectively this is a clear new stage in the socialization of capital

the key players now  those at the commanding heights of capital
operated outside or above the actual outfits  that extract the social surplus

### a good table from france

Table 3. Dispersion of pay in the private sector in 2006
Number of SMICsTotalMenWomen
D11.11.11.0
D21.21.31.1
D31.31.41.2
D41.41.51.3
Median1.61.61.5
D61.81.81.6
D72.02.11.8
D82.42.52.1
D93.13.42.6
D9/D12.93.12.6

SMIC is the national minimum wage

" It is increased each year in line with two economic indexes, namely inflation as measured by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut national des statistiques et des études économiques, INSEE), and 50% of the increase of manual workers’ basic hourly pay (Salaire horaire de base ouvrier, SHBO), as measured by the statistical services of the Ministry of Labour and Employment. The government can also decide to award an additional increase (‘coup de pouce’)."

### north hemi overview of 1% ers trip thru time

﻿

forget the data noise
and still each nation prolly suggests a slightly different plot line

note the US  since the reagan  revolution

clearly the generic north bounce back
the deflection from the path of social democracy type leveling
was keener here then elsewhere

but thatcher seems to have pulled her 1% out of a steeper deeper dive ...eh ?

dutch numbers look oddly un up turned as well as non updated

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

od story off told here

and missing the real action by using the top ten instead of a more segmented set up
to show the steepening of the power  function since 1976

$f(x) = ax^k$

share of total  wealth

more fun

## Friday, March 9, 2012

### message filed preemptively under.... returned to sender

note to paul krugman sent in a bottle:
you are a fool to buy ken rogoff's act
he's a complete corporate flunky like
marty feldstein amd greg mankiw
http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2002/070202.HTM
note the middle passages on the asian crisis and macro policy
this guy is a stooge
playing pit bull for the big boys the serious ass holes
err people
you write
"Ken Rogoff and I differ seriously on the relative risks of public debt and failure to spend on job creation. One of us is wrong , which means that the other is giving bad advice. (And yes, I’m personally sure that I’m right — but that’s a different argument). But this is an argument in good faith."
nonsense
ken was praying for a stagnation back b4 the toxic crisis of 08
and of course he likes the romney robinson import absorption
ie a relative slow down in the defict traders expansion rate
he likes that solution over the forex adjustment solution
because corporate arbitrage profits are destroyed by the deval route
u won't see this ...but you really ought to

### the rogue's ' dear joe letter'

Dear Joe:
Like you, I came to my position in Washington from the cloisters of a tenured position at a top-ranking American University. Like you, I came because I care. Unlike you, I am humbled by the World Bank and IMF staff I meet each day. I meet people who are deeply committed to bringing growth to the developing world and to alleviating poverty. I meet superb professionals who regularly work 80-hour weeks, who endure long separations from their families. Fund staff have been shot at in Bosnia, slaved for weeks without heat in the brutal Tajikistan winter, and have contracted deadly tropical diseases in Africa. These people are bright, energetic, and imaginative. Their dedication humbles me, but in your speeches, in your book, you feel free to carelessly slander them."

"Joe, you may not remember this, but in the late 1980s, I once enjoyed the privilege of being in the office next to yours for a semester. We young economists all looked up to you in awe. One of my favorite stories from that era is a lunch with you and our former colleague, Carl Shapiro, at which the two of you started discussing whether Paul Volcker merited your vote for a tenured appointment at Princeton. At one point, you turned to me and said, "Ken, you used to work for Volcker at the Fed. Tell me, is he really smart?" I responded something to the effect of "Well, he was arguably the greatest Federal Reserve Chairman of the twentieth century" To which you replied, "But is he smart like us?" I wasn't sure how to take it, since you were looking across at Carl, not me, when you said it."

"My reason for telling this story is two-fold. First, perhaps the Fund staff who you once blanket-labeled as "third rate"—and I guess you meant to include World Bank staff in this judgment also—will feel better if they know they are in the same company as the great Paul Volcker. Second, it is emblematic of the supreme self-confidence you brought with you to Washington, where you were confronted with policy problems just a little bit more difficult than anything in our mathematical models. This confidence brims over in your new 282 page book. Indeed, I failed to detect a single instance where you, Joe Stiglitz, admit to having been even slightly wrong about a major real world problem. When the U.S. economy booms in the 1990s, you take some credit. But when anything goes wrong, it is because lesser mortals like Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan or then-Treasury Secretary Rubin did not listen to your advice."

"Let me make three substantive points.

First, there are many ideas and lessons in your book with which we at the Fund would generally agree, though most of it is old hat. For example, we completely agree that there is a need for a dramatic change in how we handle situations where countries go bankrupt. IMF First Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger—who you paint as a villainess for her 1980s efforts to promote trade liberalization in World Bank policy—has forcefully advocated a far reaching IMF proposal. At our Davos [World Economic Forum] panel in February you sharply criticized the whole idea. Here, however, you now want to take credit as having been the one to strongly advance it first. Your book is long on innuendo and short on footnotes. Can you document this particular claim?"

"Second, you put forth a blueprint for how you believe the IMF can radically improve its advice on macroeconomic policy. Your ideas are at best highly controversial, at worst, snake oil.

"This leads to my third and most important point. In your role as chief economist at the World Bank, you decided to become what you see as a heroic whistleblower, speaking out against macroeconomic policies adopted during the 1990s Asian crisis that you believed to be misguided. You were 100% sure of yourself, 100% sure that your policies were absolutely the right ones. In the middle of a global wave of speculative attacks, that you yourself labeled a crisis of confidence, you fueled the panic by undermining confidence in the very institutions you were working for. Did it ever occur to you for a moment that your actions might have hurt the poor and indigent people in Asia that you care about so deeply? Do you ever lose a night's sleep thinking that just maybe, Alan Greenspan, Larry Summers, Bob Rubin, and Stan Fischer had it right—and that your impulsive actions might have deepened the downturn or delayed—even for a day—the recovery we now see in Asia?"

"Let's look at Stiglitzian prescriptions for helping a distressed emerging market debtor, the ideas you put forth as superior to existing practice. "

"Governments typically come to the IMF for financial assistance when they are having trouble finding buyers for their debt and when the value of their money is falling. The Stiglitzian prescription is to raise the profile of fiscal deficits, that is, to issue more debt and to print more money."

" You seem to believe that if a distressed government issues more currency, its citizens will suddenly think it more valuable. You seem to believe that when investors are no longer willing to hold a government's debt, all that needs to be done is to increase the supply and it will sell like hot cakes."

" We at the IMF—no, make that we on the Planet Earth—have considerable experience suggesting otherwise. We earthlings have found that when a country in fiscal distress tries to escape by printing more money, inflation rises, often uncontrollably. Uncontrolled inflation strangles growth, hurting the entire populace but, especially the indigent. The laws of economics may be different in your part of the gamma quadrant, but around here we find that when an almost bankrupt government fails to credibly constrain the time profile of its fiscal deficits, things generally get worse instead of better."

"Joe, throughout your book, you condemn the IMF because everywhere it seems to be, countries are in trouble. Isn't this a little like observing that where there are epidemics, one tends to find more doctors?"

"You cloak yourself in the mantle of John Maynard Keynes, saying that the aim of your policies is to maintain full employment. We at the IMF care a lot about employment. But if a government has come to us, it is often precisely because it is in an unsustainable position, and we have to look not just at the next two weeks, but at the next two years and beyond. "

"We certainly believe in the lessons of Keynes, but in a modern, nuanced way.

" For example, the post-1975 macroeconomics literature—which you say we are tone deaf to—emphasizes the importance of budget constraints across time. "

"It does no good to pile on IMF debt as a very short-run fix if it makes the not-so-distant future drastically worse."

" By the way, in blatant contradiction to your assertion, IMF programs frequently allow for deficits, indeed they did so in the Asia crisis. If its initial battlefield medicine was wrong, the IMF reacted, learning from its mistakes, quickly reversing course."

"No, instead of Keynes, I would cloak your theories in the mantle of Arthur Laffer and other extreme expositors of 1980s Reagan-style supply-side economics. Laffer believed that if the government would only cut tax rates, people would work harder, and total government revenues would rise. "

"The Stiglitz-Laffer theory of crisis management holds that countries need not worry about expanding deficits, as in so doing, they will increase their debt service capacity more than proportionately."

" George Bush, Sr. once labeled these ideas "voodoo economics." He was right"

". I will concede, Joe, that real-world policy economics is complicated, and just maybe further research will prove you have a point. "

"But what really puzzles me is how you could be so sure that you are 100 percent right, so sure that you were willing to "blow the whistle" in the middle of the crisis, sniping at the paramedics as they tended the wounded."

" Joe, the academic papers now coming out in top journals are increasingly supporting the interest defense policies of former First Deputy Managing Director Stan Fischer and the IMF that you, from your position at the World Bank, ignominiously sabotaged"

" Do you ever think that just maybe, Joe Stiglitz might have screwed up? That, just maybe, you were part of the problem and not part of the solution? "

"You say that the IMF is tone deaf and never listens to its critics. I know that is not true, because in my academic years, I was one of dozens of critics that the IMF bent over backwards to listen to."

"For example, during the 1980s, I was writing then-heretical papers on the moral hazard problem in IMF/World Bank lending, an issue that was echoed a decade later in the Meltzer report. "

"Did the IMF shut out my views as potentially subversive to its interests? No, the IMF insisted on publishing my work in its flagship research publication Staff Papers."

" Later, in the 1990s, Stan Fischer twice invited me to discuss my views on fixed exchange rates and open capital markets (I warned of severe risks). "

"In the end, Stan and I didn't agree on everything, but I will say that having entered his office 99 percent sure that I was right, I left somewhat humbled
by the complexities of price stabilization in high-inflation countries. "

"If only you had crossed over 19th Street from the Bank to the Fund a little more often, Joe, maybe things would have turned out differently."

"I don't have time here to do justice to some of your other offbeat policy prescriptions, but let me say this about the transition countries."

" You accuse the IMF of having "lost Russia." "

"Your analysis of the transition in Russia reads like a paper in which a theorist abstracts from all the major problems, and focuses only on the couple he can handle. "

"You neglect entirely the fact that when the IMF entered Russia, the country was not only in the middle of an economic crisis, it was in the middle of a social and political crisis as well. "

"Throughout your book, you betray an unrelenting belief in the pervasiveness of market failures, and a staunch conviction that governments can and will make things better."

"You call us "market fundamentalists." We do not believe that markets are always perfect, as you accuse. But we do believe there are many instances of government failure as well "

" on the whole, government failure is a far bigger problem than market failure in the developing world. "

"Both World Bank President Jim Wolfensohn and IMF Managing Director Horst Köhler have frequently pointed to the fundamental importance of governance and institutions in development. Again, your alternative medicines, involving ever-more government intervention, are highly dubious in many real-world settings"

.
"I haven't had time, Joe, to check all the facts in your book, but I do have some doubts. On page 112, you have Larry Summers (then Deputy U.S. Treasury Secretary) giving a "verbal" tongue lashing to former World Bank Vice-President Jean-Michel Severino. But, Joe, these two have never met. How many conversations do you report that never happened? You give an example where an IMF Staff report was issued prior to the country visit. Joe, this isn't done; I'd like to see your documentation. On page 208, you slander former IMF number two, Stan Fischer, implying that Citibank may have dangled a job offer in front of him in return for his cooperation in debt renegotiations. Joe, Stan Fischer is well known to be a person of unimpeachable integrity. Of all the false inferences and innuendos in this book, this is the most outrageous. I'd suggest you should pull this book off the shelves until this slander is corrected."

"Joe, as an academic, you are a towering genius. Like your fellow Nobel Prize winner, John Nash, you have a "beautiful mind." As a policymaker, however, you were just a bit less impressive.
Other than that, I thought it was a pretty good book.
Sincerely yours,
Ken

### a serious duping

"Ken Rogoff and I differ seriously on the relative risks of public debt and failure to spend on job creation. One of us is wrong , which means that the other is giving bad advice. (And yes, I’m personally sure that I’m right — but that’s a different argument). But this is an argument in good faith."

that's soft touch krugman exculpating a known demon

for christ sake pk the rogue was praying for a north hemi slow down before the toxics imploded bank credit

his global perspective  allowed him top seee the two paths diverging ahead

back in the mid 00's
the gross north south  trade imbalances
meant a reckoning lay out ahead
either a serious and protracted slow down in north import demand thru a stagnation interval
and a two track global system
north slow south fast
or a serious north hemi devaluation
one or the other was in order
those adicted to the easy arbitrage of fiddled forex
knew which they perfered

the rogue was on their team all the way

the Wally One Worlders'
limited liability profiteers team

recall his crossed swords with "cousin it " stiglitz
back in the day ?

### a periodic but fully determined and nopn arbitrary behaviour is certainly not "well modeled " by randomness

there are not fall  2008's  out ahead
imminent fall 08 's
built in crisis intervals

in a simple  random system
governed by a distribution of possible outcomes
with probable sequential lnks between any two system states following each other at any  time
that  barren model of market society
in the end
amounts  to just  one damn likely or unlikely  thing after another

### comments on the fly apropos the macro dry gultch of the anti keynesians

seems to be a collision somewhere in the middle where
neuron nets as metaphor for economic agents
becomes neuron nets in the agents head
little compact nets as the nodes of larger extensive nets
on the road to nets all the way down
none of this musing
oughta strike anyone as anything other then obvious
that is if the thinker is a free thinker
with a mind not caught
--- in reified glory---
------------------
the whole rat ex rep agent gig worked its temporary magic
two generations of macro types
completely oblivious to fiscal policy as macro tool
--- imagine assuming no unemployment and no defaults---
and chugging along in splendid isolation
with models completely abstracted
from the hi fi system
which itself went off to pangloss city
while the real system got itself in a short twenty years
into one terrific cock up

paine said in reply to paine...
yes the ivory tower has its purity of research
but none of this got us one inch closer to a useable policy of macro stability guided
transfer system injections and extractions
its as if automatic stablizers were like the wife that was once a soul mate
and is now an unpaid maid

paine said in reply to paine...
from the paper
"“There have been almost these two literatures in parallel. The applied labor, heterogeneous agent micro literature thinking about all these idiosyncratic shocks and what they imply for inequality in different dimensions. And then the traditional macro literature has sort of carried on with representative agent models looking at business cycles and stabilization policy and other traditional macro questions.”

exactly ???
and
" how convenient " that is
how convenient for those well heeled interests
that prefer wall street run the macro economy
and not
penn ave

paine said in reply to paine...

"In 1987, using a representative agent model, Lucas showed that business cycles had relatively little impact on overall socioeconomic welfare. By implication, he proved that eliminating those transitory fluctuations wouldn’t be particularly beneficial"
that there gives you the reason
just reverse engineer
showing that
" eliminating those transitory fluctuations wouldn’t be particularly beneficial"
now build a model system where the fluctuations
are of minor social welfare impact
good start assume no unemployment
no default
how
by assuming you need a single rep agent
now how can she default or lay herself off
she's the creditor employer too ..
nice
unless you want to guide policy in a time of mass unemployment and default
solving the aggregation problem ??
with...
"approximate aggregation "
how ad hoc can you get
why hardly beyond hicks in its vulgarity ??

"aggregate downturns tend to be times in which idiosyncratic risk—and particularly the risk of unemployment—is particularly large"
ya !

--------------------------

duncan foley battles mightily with one central  issue
an utterly deterministic  succession of
arrangements of
atoms bouncing off identical atoms
starting in some pre assumed accidental initial arrangement
proves
quite a useless contrivance
when  modeling  market systems
unless you wish to prevent state interventions

once you turn these atoms into agents with internal models and data and goals ...yikes gets messy fast
unless you assume away the messy bits
when low and behold
you can use the rationality of agents to arrive right back where atoms tok you !!!
no use  for state intervention

so
how to give a sense of these market systems in motion ??

produce something like their actual  macro patterns etc

a society of such market mediated agents
end up with something   like a cloud ?

no not at all

the only shared feature
the fate over enough time
of  both such a market mediated society
and a cloud
is  unforecastable
that is  for more then a few  succeeding intervals

and yet say we are concerned about the fate of each agent as we aren't about eeach atom ?

imagine how that impacts the considerations

so assume away the nasty bits
--------------------------

is it chaos out there  on market earth ??

try calling it
a system
of a-periodic elastically bound aggregate channels

that is the dynamic characteristic
of
our present market mediated social production system
dick goodwin as well as many younger others
covered this more then 20 years ago
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_M._Goodwin
in a little very simple book
"Essays in Nonlinear Economic Dynamics"

chaos is a lovely
even biblical sounding
word
but it chases off
the dry fruit eaters
that are most of our serious economists

also the hard work involved in constructing a model of market systems
that produces the necessary outputs
is hardly likely to receive rewards in wally world

uniqueness and stability assumed
now that is delightful
what in hell is left to study ?
example
assuming calvo pricing
so you can create
a role
for monetary policy
aiding the speed of marginal adjustments
to relative prices of imperfectly competitive outputs
ie welfare enhancing effects for households
as units of consumption

firms the real culprits out there in their real incarnation as multi national corporations
get modeled away as useless mediating structures
"hey in the end ..its all about households baby "
ya sure it is
if you just like counting casualties
not locating the "shooters"
come now
its job class choices not shocks

lots of pundits arre content to suggest chaotic systems are indistinguishable from random systems

of course they are quite different in essence
one produces fall 08 as a matter of inevitability and in swift order

the timeless random distribution makes the crisis  coming soon at your neighborhood markets
appear both  remote and kismetic

### the van guard is dead long live the van guard ?

apparently not without a hiatus

its always a wondering in the darkest of desert nights
night after night without any day break

now all the torch  lights   went out ....no sense suggesting otherwise

and  there is no  sustainable advance
no social revolution without torch  lights

spontaneous flames no matter how pervasive and powerful
are only the opportunity for hope and renewal of faith

naked raw flames burning away  are not enough
they must be controled they must light torches

i love writing bull shit
why ?

i'm shameless i guess
when well  intended

### elite-ism versus van guardism

inside bourgeois society the exploited wage class may have a semi "class  aware" fraction
formable into   a militant minority

this militant class minority is not however
in itself
the "essential stuff "  of a  van guard party VP

the VP  will form its cadre out of socially  produced agents from several classes

all of course  arising from within bourgeois society
all captives of their several modes of social construction

as  van guard party's  agents
these cadre  can push at the world historical  frontier
from the inside of that frontier from its class cloven broken ground

ie from within  the bourgois "welt"
and that is all

there are no prole ray guns to be fabricated  from diagrams dropped into our heads
by generous grace giving transcendental angelic red  hosts
looking down from on high

the bourgeois contradictory mind matter  at hand
must serve as both flint and tinder
for any provisional myopic abductive  essay
the leap into system transcendence

praxis itself the leap action itself
comes b4 enlightenment
often long b4
and only once repeated leaps have failed at least in part right away
and always  in the end
and even after  many times

# immanent sublations

## Thursday, March 8, 2012

### "the system self organised its own destruction ...."

in agent terms naming  generic names

the system's hi fi "decider elite "
fucked the credit system up  by blowing bubbles and kiting toxic shit
the end came with a bang because the fuckers let their own "vehicles"
hold  on to    tons of the toxic shit  too long.... till  it was too late

conclusion

liquidate that decider elite ?

nooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo !!!!!

### shocks or choices

a nice dichotomy eh?

are we more like pin balls or angels ?

## Wednesday, March 7, 2012

.

### chinn chiller

"plot total nondefense spending in the US (ex-interest), and normalize by potential GDP"

poof no stimulus
so stimuless was a sick over statement
this was  stim zero

### should we call it household sector real investment ?

post 16   education cost of  time and tution ?

household machinary (vehicles included )?

the house itself   (ie less lot value) ?

## Tuesday, March 6, 2012

### As I understand it

Thecorporate decider crowd takes ten percent of earnings to do the job

Suggests to me we can run these big outfits on one tenth the present surplus

### a logically sound contrivance is not a model...which is not to say its an idle pursuit

if internal consistency trumps valid replication of the subject

a proto model  then ?

no not even that

### the caboose of the high and mighty 60's

after this :

and this :

Weather Underground
or Weather Underground Organization

came this :
Symbionese Liberation Army
Symbionese Liberation Army

Umoja (Unity),
Kujichagulia (self-determination),
Ujima (collective work and responsibility),
Ujamaa (cooperative economics),
Nia (purpose),
Kuumba (creativity)
Imani (faith).

### another look at uncle's debt pie wedges : shares in the whole paper pile

mid-2011.

how much are the domestic private holdings are corporate ?
how much  those damn  private banks ?

throwing ten years of negative rates hurts who we care about
ie job class holders direct and indirect  ?