Monday, June 4, 2012
Soros informal bubble model: players are both fallible and reflexive
"reality and a misinterpretation of that trend. A bubble can develop when the feedback is initially positive in the sense that both the trend and its biased interpretation are mutually reinforced. Eventually the gap between the trend and its biased interpretation grows so wide that it becomes unsustainable. After a twilight period both the bias and the trend are reversed and reinforce each other in the opposite direction. Bubbles are usually asymmetric in shape: booms develop slowly but the bust tends to be sudden and devastating. That is due to the use of leverage: price declines precipitate the forced liquidation of leveraged positions."........................................................
He goes on to give us a narrative
The euro zone death trap
The star is of course the ECB
Skipping a lot we get to this............
" it is now clear that the main source of trouble is that the member states of the euro have surrendered to the European Central Bank their rights to create fiat money."............
Bingo ....of course Now must come the bull shit...........
The framers of this death trap " did not realize what that entails"........?........
Of course try did and right now they are showing just how clearly they intended
to use the ECB hegemony as a hammer on various member state's policy options
Back to georgie's story:
"When the euro was introduced the regulators allowed banks to buy
unlimited amounts of government bonds without setting aside any equity capital;
and the central bank accepted all government bonds at its discount window
on equal terms."
Key policy pivot that
" Commercial banks found it advantageous to accumulate the bonds of the weaker euro members in order to earn a few extra basis points. That is what caused interest rates to converge ..."
which in turn caused competitiveness to diverge. Germany, struggling with the burdens of reunification, undertook structural reforms and became more competitive. Other countries enjoyed housing and consumption booms on the back of cheap credit, making them less competitive. Then came the crash of 2008 which created conditions that were far removed from those prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty. Many governments had to shift bank liabilities on to their own balance sheets and engage in massive deficit spending. These countries found themselves in the position of a third world country that had become heavily indebted in a currency that it did not control. Due to the divergence in economic performance Europe became divided between creditor and debtor countries. This is having far reaching political implications to which I will rever"