Thursday, July 26, 2012

further essays in finding the sweet balance of zonal solidarity and national incentives : one big zone wide common sovereign fund ? nyet....... but a sorta big for now common fund ?..maybe



how big ?

think two and a half trillion euros ...



enough ?
who cares


if you read up on the restrictions obligations and sanctions for naughtiness

fuck
this  ugly and cruel  contrivance  is totally constipated


"First,  participant economies  pledge to raise earmarked redemption taxes whose proceeds directly flow into the payments to the Fund.

  participant countries have an incentive to convince the Fund to provide them with the maximum interest advantage made possible by the low refinancing cost of the Fund.

The Fund could reduce the typical difference between its own and the interest rate charged to participating countries, generating an additional advantage to reward particularly compliant behaviour."


"Second, install a number of possible sanctions into the operation. They would be triggered by failures of compliance with the provisions of the Pact, and they would increase in the severity of this failure.

 As a mirror-image of possible interest rate reductions vis-à-vis the typical rate, the Fund could sanction insufficient compliance by applying interest rate surcharges.

Selling government bonds on the open market could serve as a variant of this idea because this would increase the refinancing cost for debt not being transferred to the Fund.

 The Fund could seize  part of the gold or currency reserves or covered bonds which participant countries have to pledge at the outset when entering the Pact.  this collateral should reach the order of magnitude of 20% of transferred debt, respectively.

 The most drastic form of a sanction would be the exclusion of a participant country during the roll-in phase, a sanction which would certainly be reserved for highly severe compliance failures."


"Third, the governance of the Fund will be decisive for its ability to effectively impose sanctions in due time and of sufficient severity.

 it will be important to ascertain substantial influence of the stronger economies on decisions of the Fund, up to reserving an effective right to veto decisions.

 if open market operations should ever be used as an instrument to invoke market discipline, the governing body of the Fund needs to be independent of political influence, similar to the ECB."

yup

right out of grimm's fairy tales